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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nakoma James Powell appeals from his judgment of conviction for first degree arson and
burglary. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s order denying his motion for mistrial and,
for the first time on appeal, alleges fundamental error in the instructions to the jury.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
While returning to their home on the evening of March 20, 2015, the Hatfields noticed a
burst of fire at the Flower Aroma flower shop and called 911. (Tr., p.87, L.17 – p.90, L.7; p.91,
L.18 – p.93, L.18; p.102, L.16 – p.104, L.8.) They also saw the silhouette of a person darting
around inside the building and were concerned for him. (Tr., p.106, Ls.14-25.) With dispatch on
the phone, Mr. Hatfield went behind the building to investigate and found the back door open
and fire inside, but no one else there. (Tr., p.94, L.20 – p.95, L.14.)
Later that evening, fire investigators concluded that an accelerant, specifically gasoline,
had been used to intentionally set two separate fires in the flower shop. (Tr., p.235, L.16 –
p.236, L.9; p.239, Ls.3-13; p.241, Ls.3-12; p.246, L.2 – p.247, L.4; p.247, L.19 – p.248, L.14;
p.264, L.14 – p.268, L.13.) After putting out the flames, the fire department contacted the shop
owner, Kelly Wall, and she came to survey the damage. (Tr., p.115, L.19 – p.116, L.19.) It was
devastating. (Tr., p.116, Ls.19-22.) As Ms. Wall walked through the badly damaged building,
she also saw that someone had ransacked her office and stolen the money out of the business’s
till. (Tr., p.117, Ls.11-21.)
The shop had been closed that evening at 6:00 p.m. by the head florist, Kenna Church.
(Tr., p.131, L.2 – p.132, L.1.) Ms. Church had ensured that the building was locked when she
left. (Tr., p.132, L.2 – p.134, L.18; p.136, Ls.6-13.) To get into the building, a person would
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need a key. (Tr., p.136, Ls.14-19.) All of the employees at the flower shop had a set of keys.
(Tr., p.115, Ls.4-9.) Powell’s girlfriend, Jessica Montgomery, had been an employee at Flower
Aroma, and Powell had done some seasonal work for the florist, too. (Tr., p.109, Ls.1-8; p.110,
L.9 – p.111, L.3.) Ms. Montgomery, however, was fired earlier in the day on March 20. (Tr.,
p.122, Ls.1-7.) But Ms. Montgomery had not yet returned her keys to the florist shop. (Tr.,
p.122, Ls.12-21.) After the fire, Ms. Church attempted to collect all of the keys, but Ms.
Montgomery was unable to locate her key. (Tr., p.136, L.24 – p.137, L.10.)
In the evening, Powell had asked his next-door neighbor, Mark Anderson, to take him to
help a friend who he said had run out of gas. (Tr., p.193, L.24 – p.194, L.9; p.287, Ls.16-19.)
Powell had a small red gas can with him. (Tr., p.154, Ls.3-14; p.195, L.20 – p.196, L.3.) When
Powell left, Ms. Montgomery’s work keys went missing. (Tr., p.151, L.23 – p.152, L.19.)
Powell had Mr. Anderson take him to a service station where he filled his gas can, and then
Powell directed Mr. Anderson to drive him to a church one lot removed from the flower shop.
(Tr., p.196, L.19 – p.198, L.18; see also State’s Exs. 1a and 1b.)
After Mr. Anderson parked, Powell took the gas can and walked in the direction of the
flower shop. (Tr., p.200, Ls.13-23; p.212, L.24 – p.213, L.4.) He rushed back to the car about
ten minutes later, still carrying the gas can, and told Mr. Anderson, “Let’s go.” (Tr., p.201, Ls.125.) Seeing what appeared to be heat waves rising behind the church, Mr. Anderson asked
Powell, “What have you done?” and Powell just smiled in reply. (Tr., p.202, Ls.4-19.) Powell
and Mr. Anderson then returned home after stopping at another service station for some treats.
(Tr., p.203, L.5 – p.204, L.13.) Back home, a friend, Cassandra Grow, noticed that Powell
reeked of gasoline. (Tr., p.156, Ls.11-22.)
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Later that week, officers came to the residence of Ms. Montgomery and Powell and
interviewed them. (Tr., p.281, L.6 – p.282, L.21.) During his interview with police, Powell lied
to the officers, telling them that he did not own a gas can. (Tr., p.283, Ls.5-20.) However, about
45 seconds into a consent-based search of Powell’s crowded shed, officers located Powell’s red
gas can just inside the door. (Tr., p.283, L.21 – p.284, L.16.) At the same time as they
interviewed Powell, officers also interviewed Mr. Anderson. (Tr., p.205, L.25 – p.206, L.19;
p.287, Ls.9-15.) With Powell standing within earshot, Mr. Anderson lied to the police about
what had happened. (Tr., p.207, Ls.11-23.) Later, Mr. Anderson again met with police, this time
in the office of his probation officer, and told them the truth about what had happened. (Tr.,
p.208, L.10 – p.209, L.19; p.289, Ls.12-22.)
The state charged Powell with the crimes of arson in the first degree and burglary (R.,
pp.36-37), and later filed a persistent violator enhancement (R., pp.68-69). The case went to trial
(see Tr., pp.5-396), following which the jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts on both counts
and the enhancement (R., pp.112-13, 116). The district court entered a judgment of conviction
against Powell and sentenced him to a unified term of 30 years with 10 years fixed. (R., pp.12627.) Powell filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.129-31.)
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ISSUES
Powell states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the court commit reversible error by denying the motion for mistrial
and by failing to strike inadmissible, highly prejudicial evidence?
2.
Did the court commit fundamental error when it instructed the jury on an
alternative method of committing first degree arson which was not charged in the
Information?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Powell failed to show reversible error occurred at his trial such that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial?
2.

Has Powell failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Powell Has Failed To Show Reversible Error Occurred At His Trial Such That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His Motion For A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Ms. Grow, the following exchange

occurred:
Q.
… All right. So let’s talk about your relationship with Jessica now. Has it
changed at all?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Why has it changed? Why has your relationship with her changed?

A.

Because of multiple reasons.

Q.

Can you give me one of those reasons?

A.

She wanted me to lie.

Q.

How did that happen?

A.

She had called me and wanted me to lie.

(Tr., p.158, Ls.8-18.) At this point, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. (Tr.,
p.158, Ls.19-20.) The district court sustained the objection and then, after excusing the jury,
heard argument. (Tr., p.158, L.21 – p.160, L.10.) The district court then reaffirmed that the
objection was sustained, but denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.160, Ls.11-25.)
On appeal, Powell argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a
mistrial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of
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this case, however, shows no reversible error in light of Powell’s full and fair trial. The district
court should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review on a motion for mistrial is well-established:
The question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was
made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the
full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case,
the “abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately
stated, is one of reversible error. [The Court’s] focus is upon the continuing
impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.

State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 536-37, 285 P.3d 348, 351-52 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations
omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Powell’s Mistrial Motion
Motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. State v. Barcella, 135

Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). Under part (a) of that rule, “[a] mistrial may
be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). Powell bears the burden of
showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial.
State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978); State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30,
33, 674 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983). Powell has failed to establish both that the testimony
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offered by Ms. Grow created a legal defect in his trial and, even assuming error in its elicitation,
that the testimony deprived him of a fair trial.
In reviewing a motion for mistrial, the first issue is whether there was error at all. The
district court sustained Powell’s objection to Ms. Grow’s testimony, “She had called me and
wanted me to lie,” on the basis that the elicited testimony was hearsay. (Tr., p.159, L.11 – p.160,
L.11.) It was not. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” I.R.E. 801(c). A “statement”
is defined as “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person
intended it as an assertion.” I.R.E. 801(a). There could be no hearsay in the elicited testimony
because there was no statement in the elicited testimony.
This is not merely to say that, at this point in the questioning, no actual words spoken
outside of the courtroom had been offered in court. While that would be accurate, the court
could imply underlying words for the testimony offered, whether as a request/question, “Would
you lie for me?” or as an instruction/command, “Lie for me.”

But even implying a

communication of this nature, such words would still not constitute a “statement” for purposes of
the hearsay rule, because questions, requests, commands, and instructions are all nonassertive
utterances, not statements.

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

explained in United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 1984):
An out-of-court statement is hearsay only if it is offered for its truth…. An order
or instruction is, by its nature, neither true nor false and thus cannot be offered for
its truth…. The orders or instructions were offered to show that they occurred
rather than to prove the truth of something asserted.
Accord United States v. Murphy, 193 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d
1396, 1410 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855, 868 (7th Cir. 1985); United
7

States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 833-34 (6th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Bellomo, 176
F.3d 580, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Statements offered as evidence of commands or threats or
rules directed to the witness, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted therein, are not
hearsay.”); United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990) (questions and inquiries
are generally not hearsay because they do not assert anything). Because the prosecutor did not
elicit hearsay, the only error committed here was, in fact, the district court sustaining Powell’s
objection on that ground.
Furthermore, even if the district court did properly sustain Powell’s objection on hearsay
grounds, the motion for a mistrial was still properly denied. Error alone is not sufficient to grant
a mistrial; the error must also prejudice the defendant so as to deprive him of the ability to
receive a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1; see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128,
136 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The right to due process does not guarantee the defendant an error-free
trial, but rather a fair one.”).
On appeal, Powell’s prejudice argument appears to focus on what effect telling the jury
that Ms. Montgomery wanted Ms. Grow to lie would have had on Ms. Montgomery’s credibility.
(See Appellant’s brief, p.7.) If the claim of prejudice is that the elicited testimony would
negatively affect Ms. Montgomery’s credibility, then any error is necessarily harmless because
Ms. Montgomery’s credibility was never at issue in this case. First, Ms. Montgomery was never
called as a witness. (See, generally, Tr.) Necessarily, therefore, she never offered any testimony
in this case. Second, neither party apparently intended to call Ms. Montgomery as a witness. In
fact, the only witnesses Powell gave notice that he intended to call were (ironically, in light of
the testimony they provided) Mr. Anderson (R., pp.51-52), Ms. Church, Detective Dustin, and a
“Dru Donat” (R., p.72), the latter of whom was not ultimately called. Because Ms. Montgomery
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was not called by either party, and was never intended to be called by either party, her credibility
was never at issue in this case.
Powell also asserts that this was a close case that “rested upon the testimony of [Ms.]
Grow and [Mr.] Anderson,” which he argues “was highly suspect, especially since the Jackson
gas station surveillance video did not show Mr. Powell buying gasoline, as claimed by [Mr.]
Anderson.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) This argument fails for several reasons. First, neither Ms.
Grow’s nor Mr. Anderson’s credibility is bolstered by the (at worst) discrediting of Ms.
Montgomery, a witness who never testified at trial, nor whom either party intended to call.
Second, whatever the surveillance video may show, that would have no bearing on Ms. Grow’s
credibility. Third, as the same relates to Mr. Anderson’s credibility, Powell’s argument appears
to (at best) misunderstand the record:

There were two service stations described in Mr.

Anderson’s testimony, not one. On the way to the arson, Mr. Anderson took Powell to a service
station at Franklin and Roosevelt, where Powell filled up his gas can. (Tr., p.196, L.23 – p.197,
L.17.) The state acknowledged that there was no surveillance at that service station. (Tr., p.327,
Ls.19-25.) Then, after the arson, Mr. Anderson took Powell to a second service station, one at
Vista Avenue and Cherry Lane, where they bought snacks before returning home. (Tr., p.203,
L.5 – p.204, L.13.) The surveillance video is from this second service station. (Tr., p.303, Ls.310; Tr., p.329, Ls.13-19.) And that surveillance video did corroborate (at least to some degree)
Mr. Anderson’s testimony; it did not call his testimony into question.
Powell further notes that “[d]efense counsel did not seek a curative instruction….”
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) This seems to be an understatement. The district court invited a
curative instruction, stating: “no, I am not going to grant a mistrial because the witness has been
stopped. And I will be glad to entertain a further instruction.” (Tr., p.160, Ls.14-17.) Defense
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counsel rejected the opportunity to have a curative instruction, claiming that he was concerned
“that there is really no unringing the bell.” (Tr., p.160, Ls.18-19.) If it was error, therefore, to
fail to offer a curative or limiting instruction, in light of the sustained objection, that error was
invited, and Powell is estopped from challenging the lack of additional instructions. See State v.
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35 (2013); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d
117, 120 (1999). 1
The testimony elicited by the prosecutor from Ms. Grow, that Ms. Montgomery wanted
her to lie, was not hearsay and the district court was incorrect to sustain Powell’s objection on
that ground. Even had the statements been hearsay, in light of Powell’s full and fair trial, any
prejudice produced by eliciting those statements did not deprive Powell of his right to a fair trial.
Having failed to show reversible error in his trial, Powell has failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial. The judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.

II.
Powell Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions
A.

Introduction
The state charged Powell with first degree arson pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-802(2),

under the theory that he had burned Flower Aroma, a business where people were normally
present. (R., pp.36-37.) It appears that the elements instruction was originally limited to this
theory; however, before the instruction conference, the district court, sua sponte, added an
alternative means to the elements instruction: that Powell had burned personal property with the
1

Powell also notes that the district court did not ultimately strike the testimony, as his counsel
below requested. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5, 7-8.) Of course, as shown above, contrary to the
district court’s ruling, the testimony was not hearsay, and therefore it was not proper to sustain
the objection on that ground, much less would it have been proper to strike the testimony.
10

intent to harm the financial interests of the owner or obtain some financial gain. (See Tr., p.305,
L.21 – p.307, L.15; R., p.101.) The state objected, first noting that “the way that the State has
alleged this in the Information is to only include number six [that Powell had burned “a structure,
whether occupied or not, in which persons are normally present”]. (Tr., p.305, L.22 – p.306, L.6;
cf. R., p.101.) Notwithstanding the state’s objection, the district court chose to maintain its
instruction. (See Tr., p.306, L.7 – p.307, L.23.)
After a recess, the state again objected, this time arguing that the instruction confused the
elements the state was required to prove and could potentially cause confusion for the jury. (Tr.,
p.308, L.20 – p.309, L.7.) The state again expressed that its theory of the case encompassed the
first (and proper) means in the elements instruction: that Powell had burned “a structure, whether
occupied or not, in which persons are normally present.” (Tr., p.309, L.19 – p.310, L.1.) If the
district court intended to include the alternative means, the state asked that it at least modify the
language to clarify that it was an alternative means. (Tr., p.310, L.4 – p.313, L.16.) The district
court made some modifications, and went forward with its proposed elements instruction. (Tr.,
p.313, L.17 – p.314, L.6; R., p.101.)
Now, for the first time on appeal, Powell asserts that the district court committed
fundamental error, essentially, by failing to sustain the state’s objections. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp.8-13.) Under the circumstances of this case, Powell cannot show fundamental error entitling
him to review of this issue.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate

court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). “An erroneous
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instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury
or prejudiced a party.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01
(2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)).

C.

Powell Is Not Entitled To Review Of His Claims Of Instructional Error
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be

made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (“An
error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same principle applies to alleged errors in
jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) (“No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give
an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”);
Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this
state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Id.; see also State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
To establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Powell cannot show fundamental error in this case.
First, it is questionable whether the fundamental error standard even applies to this case.
“The application of the Perry fundamental error analysis is only triggered when there is an error
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that is not followed by a contemporaneous objection.” State v. Diaz, 163 Idaho 165, ___, 408
P.3d 920, 924 (Ct. App. 2017); see also State v. Briggs, 162 Idaho 736, 739, 404 P.3d 1287,
1290 (Ct. App. 2017). While the defense may have failed to object below, the state (as set forth
above) did object. (Tr., p.305, L.22 – p.306, L.6.) Twice. (Tr., p.308, L.20 – p.310, L.1.) This
error, therefore, was not “unobjected to.”
Second, even if fundamental error review could properly apply to defense counsel’s
failure to object—notwithstanding the state’s objections—the fact that defense counsel failed to
object where the state did raise objections is fatal on the second prong of Perry. Under that
second prong, Powell was required to show that his claimed error “plainly exists (without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision).” Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980
(emphasis added). Where the proper objection—in this case, that the alternative theory had not
been charged or presented in the evidence offered by the state—is raised by the state, defense
counsel’s failure to object cannot be based on an objective shortcoming, such as ignorance of the
law. It is more likely based on a tactical decision, such as sandbagging.
Moreover, while the state did nod to the alternative theory included by the district court
in its instructions to the jury, and tried to flesh that out during its closing argument (see Tr.,
p.355, Ls.4-23), it placed far more emphasis on the properly included theory of arson (see Tr.,
p.330, L.18 – p.331, L.4; p.333, L.11 – p.355, L.3; see esp. p.348, L.20 – p.349, L.3 and p.354,
L.1 – p.355, L.3). On the other hand, defense counsel spent much of his argument focusing on
the “revenge motive” (Tr., p.369, L.6 – p.371, L.10; p.373, L.24 – p.375, L.22), and the revenge
motive was the central focus of the alternative theory (Tr., p.355, Ls.4-9). Defense counsel also
tried to present several alternative suspects, including Ms. Wall, the owner of the flower shop,
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apparently to collect the insurance money (Tr., p.369, L.19 – p.370, L.22); an argument that is
more in line with the underlying statute upon which the district court based its additional
elements instruction, see I.C. § 18-802(4).
Third, though never specifically named, the error Powell claims is a variance. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp.8-13.) Variances can arise when “the evidence adduced at trial establishes
facts different from those alleged in the indictment,” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105
(1979), or when the jury instructions could allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged
crime, but on one or more alternative theories than alleged in the charging document, see, e.g.,
State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166,
90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). Although an actual variance between the instructions and the
allegations of a charging document implicates due process, see, e.g., State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho
891, 893, 673 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983), no due process violation actually occurs unless
the variance is fatal, see Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho
at 417-18, 716 P.2d at 1189-90 (footnote omitted)). To be fatal, the variance must amount to a
“constructive amendment” that “deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him
open to the risk of double jeopardy,” and so affects the defendant’s substantial rights. State v.
Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003); see also State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 479, 272 P.3d 417, 451 (2012) (citations omitted). A constructive amendment occurs if a
variance alters the charging document to the extent that the defendant is tried for a crime of a
greater degree or a different nature. Jones, 140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889; State v. Colwell, 124
Idaho 560, 566, 871 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993).
The variance in this case, where the state charged arson based on Idaho Code § 18-802(2)
but the district court, sua sponte, added an alternative theory based on Idaho Code § 18-802(4),
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does not constitute a constructive amendment because, first, this is still first degree arson, either
way or both. Second, this variance did not leave Powell open to the risk of double jeopardy
because there was only one arson, limited to a specific business, Flower Aroma, that was burned
on a specific date. Third, where the state objected to the alternative theory explaining that it had
only charged the primary theory (that Powell burned a structure where people were normally
present) and rather than join the objection Powell stood silent, Powell cannot now claim that he
was surprised by the enlarged instruction, or that his defense was embarrassed, or that he was
deprived of any fair notice. Thus, though the district court did add a variance to the elements
instruction, under the circumstances of this case, it was not fatal. Powell has therefore failed to
show the violation of an unwaived constitutional right.
Fourth, the final prong of the fundamental error standard requires Powell to “demonstrate
that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. A
variance affects the substantial rights of a defendant only when it is fatal, i.e., “when it deprives
the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy.”
Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-78, 716 P.2d 118990 (footnote omitted)). For the reasons set forth above, Powell has failed to demonstrate that his
substantial rights were affected by the variance he claims for the first time on appeal and has,
therefore, failed to satisfy the final element of the Perry fundamental error analysis.
Moreover, Powell’s claim of prejudice, that he had a defense to the crime because he
burned the business after hours, is unavailing. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) This argument displays
the same legal confusion exhibited by the district court below. Under the plain language of the
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statute, the fact that the fire was after hours and the business was then closed is no defense to
first degree arson. That statute reads:
Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages:
… (2) Any structure, whether occupied or not, in which persons are normally
present, including without limitation … business establishments …; … is guilty of
arson in the first degree.
I.C. § 18-802(2) (emphasis added). That Flower Aroma was closed when Powell set the fires is
no defense; Flower Aroma is a “business establishment[]” where people “are normally present.”
Furthermore, Powell’s actual trial strategy was to argue that the state had failed to prove that he,
and not some other perpetrator, burned the business. He presented no theory below that, though
he had burned Flower Aroma, it was after hours and therefore not a “structure … in which
persons are normally present.”
Fifth and finally, on appeal, Powell also claims that “the state urged the court to instruct
upon the uncharged alternative method.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Review of the record, as set
forth above, belies this claim: The state objected, twice, to the inclusion of the alternative
theory. (Tr., p.305, L.22 – p.306, L.6; p.308, L.20 – p.310, L.1.) When it quickly became
apparent that the district court would instruct the jury based on its reading of the statute, and not
based on the state’s reading, the state shifted gears and, as an alternative, sought to mitigate its
prejudice by adding clarification to the district court’s proposed instruction. (Tr., p.310, L.2 –
p.313, L.13.) The state did not request the district court’s sua sponte inclusion of the variance.
Under the circumstances of this case, where the state objected to the district court’s sua
sponte inclusion in the elements instruction of an uncharged alternative theory of Powell’s guilt,
Powell has failed to show that fundamental error review applies. Even assuming fundamental
error is the correct standard to apply, under the facts of this case, Powell cannot demonstrate
fundamental error. Powell is therefore not entitled to appellate review of this issue.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Powell’s convictions for first degree
arson and burglary.
DATED this 27th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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